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Abstract 
Zero-sum thinking and aversion to trade pervade our society, yet fly in the face of everyday experience 
and the consensus of economists. Boyer and Petersen’s evolutionary model invokes coalitional 
psychology to explain these puzzling intuitions. I raise several empirical challenges to this explanation, 
proposing two alternative mechanisms—intuitive mercantilism (assigning value to money rather than 
goods) and errors in perspective-taking. 
 
Commentary 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1999/1776) overturned a dogma that had long dominated 
economic thinking—the mercantilist theory of trade. Mercantilism held that exporting nations “won” 
because they gained gold (while giving up goods) while importing nations “lost” because they gave up 
gold (while gaining goods). The notion that a trade can have winners and losers is nonsensical, according 
to Smith: Two people would not agree to a trade unless they both felt it was in their interest. Why else 
would a buyer and seller voluntarily execute the transaction? This basic insight is borne out by common 
sense, everyday experience, volumes of empirical and theoretical research, and the essentially universal 
consensus of economists. 
 
Yet, zero-sum talk of “winners” and “losers” at trade pervade our society. Zero-sum thinking occupies 
the thoughts of powerful political leaders, and appears across a multiplicity of countries and political 
persuasions. What can explain the ubiquity of this idea—across both space and time—that flies in the 
face of so much evidence? 
 
An evolutionary model of folk-economic beliefs provides an appealing solution to this puzzle and many 
others. Our inborn intuitions about physics and psychology (e.g., Carey, 2009) evolved in an 
environment with objects and minds similar to their modern counterparts. But any inborn intuitions we 
have about economics evolved in a world of exchange that could hardly be more different from the 
modern economy, global in scale and mediated by money (Fiske, 1992; Pinker, 2002). Given the 
mismatch in environments, it makes sense that folk-economic beliefs built atop evolved intuitions 
should not, in general, track modern economic realities. 
 
To explain aversion to trade as a specific folk-economic belief, Boyer and Petersen invoke coalitional 
psychology—an aversion to transferring resources to rival groups. Despite my general enthusiasm for 
Boyer and Petersen’s theory, I find other mechanisms more plausible in the case of zero-sum thinking, 
based on recent results from my own research program. 
 
First, Boyer and Petersen make the specific prediction that aversion to trade, being rooted in coalitional 
psychology, should “invariably occur in the context of, precisely, debates about trade between countries.” 
As it happens, I have tested the idea that trade imbalances would be viewed as problematic even in the 
context of trade among U.S. states. Indeed, Arizona is seen as “losing” to Iowa when Arizonans import 
shoes from Iowa, albeit not to the same extent as when they import shoes from Thailand (Johnson, 
Zhang, & Keil, 2018a). At the very least, some other factors must be explaining some of the aversion 
to trade. 
 
Second, an explanation based on coalitional psychology predicts that zero-sum thinking should exist at 
the level of international trade, but not of exchanges among individuals, particularly within the same 
country. Yet, in my own work, people evaluating simple monetary exchanges (e.g., Sally buying a shirt 
from Tony’s store for $30) frequently believed that sellers were made better off at the expense of buyers 
(Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2018b), espousing a zero-sum belief. These beliefs are no stronger when the 
seller comes from a different country than the buyer, and only modestly stronger when describing trade 
in aggregate across countries (Johnson et al., 2018a). These results are all difficult to square with the 
idea that coalitional psychology is an important driver of zero-sum thinking.   
 
Third, let us consider the fact that our evolutionary ancestors exchanged goods in a world without 
currency. The most straightforward prediction would be that we should have difficulty intuitively 
assigning value to useless bits of paper. This predicts an aversion to trade imbalances—in the opposite 
direction. Trade imbalances should be seen as favoring the country that is importing (intrinsically 
valuable) goods in exchange for (intrinsically worthless) currency. Yet, our intuitions are the opposite: 
The U.S. “loses” to China because the U.S. imports more than it exports. If coalitional psychology 
accounted for these intuitions, it would presuppose the intuition that money is worth more, not less, 
than the goods and services it can purchase—that is, mercantilist thinking of the type Smith debunked. 
 
Fourth, if people have special difficulty thinking about money, then one would expect currency-
mediated exchanges (e.g., Sally purchasing a shirt from Tony’s store) to be seen as zero-sum but barters 
(e.g., neighbors swapping soy sauce for vinegar) as positive-sum. In fact, people often see both types of 
exchanges as zero-sum, but for different reasons (Johnson et al., 2018b). For currency-mediated 
exchanges, buyers are seen as worse-off while sellers are seen as better-off, consistent with the 
mercantilist intuition that money is worth more than the goods it can purchase. But for like-kind barters, 
both parties are seen as neither gaining nor losing from the exchange. Once again, this is consistent with 
mercantilist thinking that equates wealth with money, since no money changes hands. But it is precisely 
the opposite of what an evolutionary account would seem to predict, since goods (but not currency) 
have intrinsic value and existed in our evolutionary environment. 
 
I am therefore forced to conclude that coalitional psychology has a limited role in explaining our basic 
aversion to trade. (That said, it may well aggravate this basic anti-trade bias, causing a special aversion 
to trade with rival countries). Instead, I propose two alternative mechanisms. First, as suggested above, 
people are intuitive mercantilists, imputing to money value over-and-above the goods it can purchase. 
Intuitive mercantilism is encouraged by several features of money (e.g., fungibility, permanence, and 
communicative role for conveying relative prices). If mercantilist thinking emerges late in development, 
this would undercut claims of its innateness. Second, when contemplating exchanges in the abstract, 
people often fail to take the perspective of the parties. When encouraged to do so, they recognize that 
people have self-interested reasons for exchange and that both parties are thus made better off (Johnson 
et al., 2018b). 
 
Adam Smith wrote: “Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning 
of every [exchange]” (Smith, 1999/1776, p. 118–119). Few truths in modern life appear to be so 
obvious, yet so elusive. 
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